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The confusion and barrenness of 
 psychology is not to be explained by call-
ing it a “young science.” […] For in psy-
chology there are experimental methods 
and conceptual confusion. The existence 
of the experimental method makes us 
think we have the means of solving the 
problems which trouble us; though prob-
lems and method pass one another by. 
 Wittgenstein (1958, p. 232)
Sometimes it pays off to “think.” 
 Pernu (2008, p. 36)
Psychology is not a young science any-
more: as the textbooks tell us, it won its 
independence, from philosophy, a century 
and a half ago, through the efforts of such 
luminaries as Gustav Fechner and William 
James. And yet, if an offhand remark by 
a long-dead philosopher on psychology’s 
conceptual confusion still touches a raw 
nerve in some of us psychologists, it is 
probably because psychology’s intellectual 
roots have been all along, and will likely 
remain, firmly planted in the philosophy 
of mind.
Philosophy and psychology may be seen 
as rivals insofar as each counts the other as a 
proper part of its subject matter. This stand-
off can, however, be resolved in a peaceful and 
productive manner, if we only realize that 
psychological science and the philosophy of 
mind are also natural partners, because these 
disciplines have joint custody over some of the 
most daunting – and most exciting – ques-
tions that humanity ever dared to contem-
plate. This partnership is too precious to be 
treated casually: arguably, the most momen-
tous theoretical advances in psychology are 
typically motivated by deeply philosophical 
considerations, and the best thinking in the 
philosophy of mind is inspired by, and reflects 
back upon, scientific findings and theories.
An exemplary approach to the relationship 
between philosophy and psychology is the one 
advocated by Quine (1969, pp. 126–127):
My position is a naturalistic one; I see phi-
losophy not as a priori […] groundwork 
for science, but as continuous with science. 
I see philosophy and science as in the same 
boat – a boat which, to revert to Neurath’s 
figure as I so often do, we can rebuild only 
at sea while staying afloat in it.1 There is no 
external vantage point, no first philosophy.
In the remainder of this brief note, I list 
some of the challenges that mark the fron-
tiers of theoretical and philosophical psy-
chology and that are motivated both by the 
lingering echoes of Wittgenstein’s criticism 
and by Quine’s positive outlook.2
How to paint tHe big picture
Perhaps the greatest challenge facing any 
attempt to understand how the mind 
works is the need to take in massive 
amounts of data. In physics, the fate of a 
foundational theory, and hence a certain 
broad-canvas conception of the universe, 
may hinge on the outcome of a single 
experiment.3 In contrast, in psychology 
(and in the neurosciences), a vigorous 
but undiscriminating application of the 
scientific method can only result in a big 
picture in the style of Jackson Pollock – 
unless, on the one hand, proper theoreti-
cal tools are brought to bear on all stages 
of the scientific inquiry and, on the other 
hand, intellectual discipline that charac-
terizes properly conducted philosophical 
inquiry is exercised. The present journal, 
Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical 
Psychology, will adopt precisely this two-
pronged approach.
Given the mind’s complexity and the 
need for its explanation to span many levels 
(Marr and Poggio, 1977; Marr, 1982), theo-
rists who study it must develop a sophis-
ticated strategy for dealing with published 
experimental findings. Which ones should 
I ignore as insignificant, even if they appear 
in the best journals? Which ones should I 
think hard about, even if the theoretical 
accounts offered by their authors make lit-
tle sense to me? And which ones should I 
actively seek out, to fill a gap in my under-
standing of things?
Interestingly, insofar as these meta-sci-
entific questions have to do with differen-
tial value that we place on different items 
of knowledge, they are also philosophical. 
Hilary Putnam4 described this situation as 
follows (Putnam, 2012, p. 47):
I have argued that even when the judg-
ments of reasonableness are left tacit, such 
judgments are presupposed by scientific 
inquiry. (Indeed, judgments of coherence 
are essential even at the observational 
level: we have to decide which observa-
tions to trust, which scientists to trust – 
sometimes even which of our memories 
1Here’s Otto Neurath’s boat metaphor (Protokollsaetze, 
Erkenntnis 3: 204–214, 1932), as explained by Quine 
(1960, p. 3): “We are like sailors who on the open sea 
must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start 
afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a 
new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest 
of the ship is used as support. In this way, by using the 
old beams and driftwood the ship can be shaped enti-
rely anew, but only by gradual reconstruction.”
2For a somewhat different set of challenges to theore-
tical psychology, which complements those listed here, 
see Lloyd (2010).
3Here and elsewhere in the present article, I single out 
physics in the hope of helping to dispel the popular 
misconception that scientists who are not physicists 
are prone to physics envy. Given how much more 
complex psychology and the neurosciences are, com-
pared to physics, cognitive scientists should by rights 
be proud enough of their own domain and mode of 
inquiry. Moreover, when a research program in co-
gnition (e.g., “generative” linguistics; Chomsky, 2004) 
does make a point of looking up to physics, the re-
sults tend to be, historically, less than encouraging (see 
Postal, 2004, for an overview and Bouchard, 2012, for 
an in-depth critical examination of a central aspect of 
Chomsky’s Minimalist theory). 
4Putnam is, to the best of my knowledge, the only li-
ving philosopher who has been compared with Ari-
stotle, Leibniz, Kant, Mill, and Russell all at once (De 
Caro and Macarthur, 2012, p. 1).
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The final frontier of interdisciplinar-
ity in psychology is the no man’s land that 
separates it from the humanities – “the last 
bastion of magic” (Kean, 2011). The tradi-
tionally strong humanistic undercurrents 
in philosophy (Putnam, 2012),7 the grow-
ing interest among cognitive psychologists 
in aesthetics (e.g., Kintsch, 2012) and in 
literature (Zunshine, 2010), and the emer-
gence of a “third culture” that is equally at 
home in science and technology and in the 
humanities (Brockman, 1996; Kelly, 1998) 
all indicate that a further blurring of the 
intellectual borders is to be expected, and 
that it is a good idea to help this process 
along.
“notHing in biology…”
If theoretical thinkers in science, philoso-
phy, and the humanities are all concerned 
with what we humans (and other animals) 
are, they should also be interested in under-
standing how we got to be this way. The 
short answer to this latter question is, of 
course, evolution. Given that the mind as 
we know it is first and foremost a biological 
phenomenon and that “nothing in biology 
makes sense except in the light of evolu-
tion” (Dobzhansky, 1973), it should not be 
surprising that rigorous evolutionary think-
ing has much to contribute to understand-
ing it (for recent overviews, see Jablonka 
and Lamb, 2007; Pinker, 2010). Specific 
examples that come to mind have to do 
with individual learning (Lehmann et al., 
2008), comparative neurobiology (Lefebvre 
et al., 2004), animal culture (Danchin and 
Wagner, 2010), and language (Chater and 
Christiansen, 2010; Syal and Finlay, 2010).8
explaining consciousness
Just as the sui generis status of language in 
cognitive science has given way to a realiza-
tion that it might be amenable to explana-
tion within the same theoretical framework 
as the rest of cognition, so did consciousness 
ries of visual perception and learning that 
ignore issues of dimensionality (Tsotsos, 
1990; Edelman, 1993).
Such considerations notwithstanding, 
psychological theories can be surprisingly 
resilient (Greenwald, 2012, Table 1). My 
impression is that this happens because too 
often theories are stated in a conceptually 
inadequate language, which in turn stems 
from glossing over interdisciplinary issues. 
It seems strange that at this time, decades 
after the disciplines referred to collectively 
as cognitive science came to be recognized 
as interrelated, a call for more interdiscipli-
narity in psychology should still sound like 
a challenge. Nevertheless, a challenge it is: 
what may count for a big picture in psychol-
ogy is likely to span only a few pieces of the 
great jigsaw puzzle of how the mind works.
It is important to note that the need for 
conceptual breadth exists not just in trying to 
understand how various cognitive tasks are 
addressed, but also at the more basic level of 
grasping the nature of the tasks themselves. 
Thus, neglecting to question the common 
assumption that the purpose of vision is to 
reconstruct the geometrical layout of the 
environment can lead an entire field on a dec-
ades-long wild goose chase (Sloman, 1989; 
Edelman, 2009), which ends with a realization 
that vision and the rest of cognition (in par-
ticular, motor control) are intimately inter-
related and must therefore fit within the same 
overarching psychological theory.
By acknowledging and pondering the 
importance of interdisciplinarity in theo-
retical psychology, we can better appreci-
ate the role of philosophy in opening up 
for us a whole new set of dimensions of 
conceptual breadth. The contribution of 
philosophical thinking to psychology will 
be particularly effective if such thinking 
avoids being parochial in its own domain. 
As one can learn from Scharfstein’s (1998) 
outstanding survey of the history of world 
philosophy (which unfortunately goes only 
as far as late eighteenth century), insights 
into all of the questions of interest to psy-
chologists can be found in philosophical 
traditions both in the East and in the West. 
We must, therefore, encourage work that 
connects those philosophical traditions to 
one another (e.g., Kalansuriya, 1993) and 
draws upon Eastern thinking, which is still 
under-appreciated by Western scientists, in 
the context of psychological theorizing (e.g., 
Waldron, 2002; cf. Metzinger, 2003, p. 566).
to trust.) … I have argued that my prag-
matist teachers were right: “knowledge of 
facts presupposes knowledge of values.”5
trutH and consequences
The realization that values have a place in 
meta-theoretical discourse in psychology 
(just as they do in other sciences) gives 
us license to set our sights considerably 
higher than merely gathering reliable and 
ample empirical findings with regard to 
whatever psychological phenomenon that 
is under investigation. Psychology should, 
I believe, position itself so as to be able, 
with full confidence, to echo a sentiment 
with which the emeritus MIT professor 
of linguistics Morris Halle reportedly 
used to open his course: “I’m not here to 
tell you the news; I’m here to tell you the 
truth.”6
Can one reasonably hold a theoretical 
claim in psychology to be true, in the same 
sense that, say, special relativity is in phys-
ics? I think so, and my case in point, which 
I argued at length elsewhere (Edelman, 
2008a,b), is the identification of cognition 
with a class of computations (e.g., Minsky, 
1985; McDermott, 2001). It seems to me 
also that making such claims – as long as 
they are empirically sound and theoretically 
pleasing – is the right thing to do meth-
odologically speaking: we can truly keep 
abreast of the news only if we keep asking 
after the truth.
ideas witHout borders
In psychology, unlike physics, truth straddles 
disciplinary boundaries: crucial informa-
tion on the strength of which a psychologi-
cal theory may stand or fall can come from 
another discipline altogether. For instance, 
findings from neuroscience can lend sup-
port to a broad explanatory framework in 
psychology, such as Bayesian inference (Lee 
and Mumford, 2003) or Hebbian learning 
(Caporale and Dan, 2008). In the same 
vein, complexity estimates, arrived at by 
methods of computer science, that show a 
certain class of algorithms to be intractable, 
can doom a corresponding family of psy-
chological theories, as in the case of theo-
5Putnam (2012, p. 47, footnote 18) traces this phrase 
to William James.
6Quoted by two of Halle’s former students, Peter Culi-
cover and Ray Jackendoff, in an epigraph to their book 
Simpler Syntax (Culicover and Jackendoff, 2005).
7As (Putnam, 2012, p. 49, footnote 21) writes, “I do not 
think that philosophy can be turned into a science be-
cause there are areas of philosophy that are essentially 
humanistic, and I think that turning the humanities 
into science is a fantasy, and a dangerous fantasy at 
that. But there are parts of philosophy that overlap 
with science.”
8A rebooted evolutionary psychology is clearly capable 
of doing much better than generating “just so stories” 
for which it used to get a bad reputation a decade or 
so ago.
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us square in the middle of what Warren 
McCulloch (1965) so memorably called “the 
very den of the metaphysician, strewn with 
the bones of the former explorers” (among 
which McCulloch singles out “the femur of 
Immanuel Kant” and also “his skull, which 
housed his computing machine”).
As McCulloch showed us (always lead-
ing by example), we need not be afraid of 
metaphysics. Not that our attitude toward 
it matters much: a repudiation of meta-
physics is in itself a metaphysical stance 
(as noted, for instance, by Putnam, 2012, 
in his discussion of logical positivism and 
of Wittgenstein’s philosophy). Admittedly, 
by explicitly allowing metaphysics into 
our discourse (for instance, the metaphys-
ics of embodiment or of reality; Edelman, 
2011a,b), we face the challenge of separating 
idle speculation from serious ideas – but the 
very same challenge is, of course, the first 
order of business in any respectable inquiry, 
be it scientific or philosophical.
This brings us back to our theme: the 
relationship between science and phi-
losophy and the challenges that they face 
together, summarized perfectly by Putnam 
(2012, p. 626):
Q: What is the proper role of philosophy 
in relation to psychology, artificial intel-
ligence, and the neurosciences?
A: To be a gadfly, of course. Seriously, … 
the most exciting task of philosophy of 
science is to combine clarification of the 
concepts of science with reflection on the 
implication of scientific theories, both 
proposed theories and theories that are 
not considered to be confirmed, for great 
metaphysical issues.
Sharpening psychology’s theoretical 
tools by focusing on its conceptual founda-
tions in a broad perspective, which includes 
philosophical considerations and, indeed, 
metaphysics, may help us make sense of 
the deluge of findings that would otherwise 
sweep us into the barren ocean of mere data.
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